Cross-tenant object access in a SaaS API
Broken object-level authorization allowed reading another tenant's records by changing a single identifier. Fixed with a server-side ownership check on every object route.
Bug bounty · Web & API security
Independent security researcher hunting access-control and authentication bugs in web applications and APIs. Manual testing first, source-assisted where scope allows, clear reproduction steps in every report.
A sample of vulnerability classes I work with. Company names and raw evidence are withheld wherever disclosure terms require it.
Broken object-level authorization allowed reading another tenant's records by changing a single identifier. Fixed with a server-side ownership check on every object route.
Reset tokens stayed valid after use and after a password change, allowing replay inside the token lifetime. Fixed with single-use tokens and session invalidation.
An import endpoint fetched arbitrary URLs server-side, reaching internal metadata services. Fixed with a destination allowlist and egress filtering.
// details redacted where required by program policy
Small, deliberate set of tools. Most time goes into reading requests, responses, and source code.
I test only inside the scope published by each program and follow its rules of engagement. Findings go straight to the vendor with reproduction steps; public write-ups only after disclosure terms allow it.
For private programs, triage questions, or a second pair of eyes on an auth bug.
Fingerprint on request. Encrypted reports welcome.